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Abstract 
The SADC is a sub-regional international organisation comprised of 15 transitional States that have embraced the 
principle of the rule of law as a basic norm of their constitutional arrangements. Their biggest challenge presently is to 
undo the provocative and salient legacy of social, economic and psychological apartheid on their territories for almost a 
century, without disrupting their developmental endeavours. This article examines the question of what role if any the 
SADC Tribunal envisaged under Article 9 of the constitutive SADC Treaty might play to facilitate successful 
transitions from apartheid to egalitarian rule. It shows that a multiplicity of dialectics abound that do not allow for easy 
answers, much to the frustration of both the cultural relativists and their rivals, the universalists, regarding human rights 
protection. The article recommends meaningful pedagogical engagement of the challenges confronting the SADC sub-
region as a direct consequence of almost a century of apartheid – the worst form of governance known to man in recent 
times. This should inform national, sub-regional and regional dynamics in the pursuit of SADC goals and aspirations. 
SADC Human Rights Courts and Tribunals are encouraged to develop a “due-account jurisprudence” that is congruous 
with the transitional requirements of their societies just as the German Federal Constitutional Court had done in the 
aftermath of the fall of the Reich, and also after the re-unification of Germany.  
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1. Introduction 
By a Declaration and Treaty of 17 August 1992, the Heads of State or Government of ten Southern 
African States
3
 established the Southern African Development Community (SADC). The 
constitutive Declaration and Treaty’s preamble is clear that the SADC is both a discontinuation and 
a continuation of the Southern African Coordination Conference
4
 (SADCC) which had been 
established pursuant to the Lusaka Declaration of 1 April 1980 as a forum to facilitate economic 
                                                 
1
 Established by the SADC Treaty (1992) which came into force in 1993, it comprises the following States: Angola, 
Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Mauritius, Madagascar, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The SADC has a hybrid of functions that are 
interconnected and collectively linked to the overarching aim of creating a welfarist regional community similar 
perhaps to the European Community. See also Treaty Establishing the Southern African Development Community, 5 
RADIC (1993) p. 415; Treaty of the Southern African Development Community (SADC), 17 August 1992, Windhoek, 
32 International Legal Materials 116. 
2
 Article 9(1)(f) of the SADC Treaty (1992) provides for the Establishment of the SADC Tribunal as a Community 
institution. See also SADC website: Protocol on Tribunal and Rules of Procedure Thereof, available at: <www.sadc-
tribunal.org/docs/Protocol_on_Tribunal_and_Rules_thereof.pdf> (accessed 12 May 2012). 
3
 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
4
 Established in 1980 by Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Tanzania, Zambia and 
Zimbabwe as a forum for economic liberation pursuant to the Lusaka Declaration of 1 April 1980. See also SADC 
website:  http://www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/119 (last accessed 12 May 2012) 
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liberation from apartheid South Africa.
5
 The SADCC itself was comprised of all the founding 
Member States Parties of the SADC, less Namibia. Membership of the sub-regional organisation 
quickly rose by half pursuant to Article 42 accessions (new Article 43 of the consolidated text of the 
SADC Treaty as amended at Blantyre in August 2001 – SADC Treaty).6 South Africa was the first 
to accede on 29 August 1994, followed by the following: Mauritius, 28 August 1995; Democratic 
Republic of Congo, 28 February 1998; Madagascar, 21 February 2006; and Seychelles, 16 August 
2008.  The SADC Treaty exists in three authoritative languages,
7
 reflecting the diverse colonial 
histories of Member States Parties.  
 
The SADC Treaty lists among its primary objectives the acceleration of economic growth of the 
region and the improvement of living conditions of its citizens through regional cooperation in 
different fields, and the harmonisation of economic development of the region.
8
 In Article 4, the 
organisation lists among its cardinal principles human rights, democracy and the rule of law,
9
 and 
the peaceful settlement of disputes.
10
  
 
The requirement of the rule of law is indisputable anywhere you look. When challenged, even the 
worst totalitarian governments refer to legal standards of some system in their own defence – 
usually Article 2(1) and often enough Article 2(4) of the United Nations (UN) Charter. The former 
states that: “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its 
Members.” Classical approaches to international law that interpreted this provision as declaring an 
unfettered discretion regarding State conduct within the confines of their own territories have since 
been discredited.
11
 The latter is said to protect the territorial integrity and political independence of 
all States from external interference.
12
 Almost always, totalitarian States attempt to clothe even their 
worst acts with an appearance of legality.  
 
The rule of law has been described as a “political value” that is characterised by the requirement to 
restrict an entity’s exercise of power through the separation and counterbalancing of the 
competencies of its institutions. The purpose is to ensure that judicial power is separated from other 
                                                 
5
 See Article 45 of the amended SADC Treaty, 2001. 
6
 See SADC website: <www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/120> (accessed 12 May 2012). 
7
 English, French and Portuguese. 
8
 Article 5. 
9
 Article 4(c). 
10
 Article 4(e). 
11
 Several UN institutions established after World War II contradict this view. In particular The UN Commission on 
Human Security and the recent  inauguration and immediate application of the responsibility to protect principle in 
Libya support the view that under modern international law, sovereignty does not trump human rights. 
12
 United Nations Charter (UNC), 26 June 1945, San Francisco, UKTS 67 (1946) Cmd. 7015, 1 UNTS xvi. 
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powers of the entity, and the other powers are subjected to oversight of the judiciary.
13
 Where this 
paradigm thrives, liberty also thrives. According to Tamanaha,
14
 liberty is the right to do whatever 
the law permits. The law establishes the scope of secure action within which individuals may then 
conduct their affairs as they please. Members of a community have liberty only to the extent that all 
are restrained by the law from doing harm to one another. In this sense liberty is possible only under 
the rule of law which is the only security from tyranny. Critical to the rule of law is a functional 
independent judiciary. 
 
The idea is not so much to ensure judicial rectitude and public confidence, as to prevent the executive and its 
many agents from imposing their powers, interests and persecutive inclinations upon the judiciary. The 
magistrate can then be perceived as the citizen’s most necessary, and also most likely, protector. The judiciary 
is the point of most direct confrontation between the government, law and the individual, and it can therefore 
serve as the best barrier against lawless governmental actions.
15
 
 
By seeking to ensure that legislative and executive functions are not united in the same body of 
persons, and that the judiciary retains and maintains continuing oversight over the other institutions 
of power, power becomes a check on power. Without such a check on power apprehensions will 
persist that the same monarch or senate may enact tyrannical laws and execute them in a tyrannical 
manner.
16
 Thus, the principle of the separation of powers is the foremost test of any claims to 
governing in accordance with the principle of the rule of law. Any tinkering on the edges or at the 
core of it diminishes any claim to governing by or living under the rule of law. 
 
The majority of SADC States are signatories to a wide range of regional and international 
instruments that espouse the rule of law as a fundamental of both States Parties’ national and sub-
regional constitutional arrangements. State practice shows that geographical circumstances, or 
intimate historical ties, or present concerns of fundamental importance often make for more 
successful treaty regimes than those engaged in for the pursuit of mere ephemeral or theoretical 
matters. Agreements entered into by SADC States as Member States Parties of either the African 
Union (AU) or Commonwealth Organization fall into the former category. Their shared historical, 
cultural, developmental and trade links sustain an affinity that gives an enormously inherent 
potential for success of their treaty regimes. It bolsters even their confidence to sanction recalcitrant 
conduct of States Parties, including suspension from membership of the organisation if and when 
they violate the rules of the organisation, until the required compliance is achieved.   
 
                                                 
13
 See also M. Krygier, ‘Ethical Positivism and the Liberalism of Fear’, in T. Campbell and J. Goldsworthy (eds.), 
Judicial Power, Democracy and  Legal Positivism (Dartmouth, 2000) p. 59. 
14
 B. Z. Tamanaha, On the Rule of Law: History, Politics, Theory (CUP, 2000) p. 52. 
15
 Ibid.  
16
 Ibid. 
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The recent troubles in both Mali and Madagascar demonstrate the co-operation of Africa’s sub-
regional entities with the regional body, the AU,
17
 to enforce their shared values. On 21 March 
2012, soldiers led by Captain Amadou Sanogo overthrew the government of President Amadou 
Toumani Toure in a coup d’état. The AU Peace and Security Council immediately suspended 
Mali’s membership of the AU until the restoration of the constitutional head of State and his 
government. The Council held that: 
 Given the manner in which the mutineers in Mali have acted against a constitutional government, and 
consistent with the various instruments of the African Union and ECOWAS, [Economic Commission of 
West African States] the Council decided Mali should be suspended from further participation in all its 
activities until the effective restoration of constitutional order is achieved without delay.
18
 
 
Following its 316th
 
meeting in Addis Ababa on 3 April 2012, the AU Peace and Security Council 
issued a communique strongly denouncing the coup d'état of 22 March in Mali and underlining its 
commitment to restore constitutional order in support of the sub-regional organisation’s – 
ECOWAS – efforts to ensure “the return to constitutional order in the country”, in pursuance of the 
communiqué issued at the end of the 40th Ordinary Session of the Authority of Heads of State and 
Government of ECOWAS, held in Abuja on 16 and 17 February 2012,
19
  and several other 
admonitions.
20
 This supports the view that African States in particular are evolving constitutional 
regional customary international law norms on various issues, including the inviolable sanctity of 
constitutional processes for change of governments. ECOWAS, which appears to be playing the 
lead-role in the Mali case, is the equivalent of the SADC in that they are both sub-regional 
organisations of the African region.  
 
The SADC had itself taken similar action against Madagascar by its Double Troika Summit 
Communique of 14 January 2010
21
 which had reiterated and maintained the suspension of 
Madagascar from all SADC organs, structures and institutions until the restoration of constitutional 
order in that country, and called upon the AU, UN and other international organisations and 
institutions to also apply the same measure. The Summit had rejected “any attempt to use 
democratic means, institutions and processes to legitimise Governments that came to power through 
unconstitutional means, and urged the international community, in particular the development 
                                                 
17
 Successor to the Organization of African Union. See the Constitutive Act of the African Union (2000), entered into 
force, 2001. See African Union website:  <www.au.int/en/about/constitutive_act> (accessed 12 May 2012). 
18
 ‘African Union suspends Mali’, Voice of America website: <www.voanews.com/english/news/africa/AU-Malis-
President-Safe-After-Coup-143994376.html> (accessed 12 May 2012). See also Peace and Security Council 
Communique of 3 April 2012 following its 316th
 
Meeting in Addis Ababa, PSC/PR/COMM.(CCCXVI); African Union 
website: <au.int/en/dp/ps/content/peace-and-security-council-african-union-au-its-316th-meeting-held-3-april-2012-
adopted-fo-0> (accessed 12 May 2012). 
19
 Peace and Security Council Communique, ibid. 
20
 See also the communiques following from Extraordinary Summit held in Abidjan on 27 March 2012, the meeting of 
the delegation of the six Heads of State of ECOWAS held in Abidjan on 29 March 2012, and the Extraordinary Session 
held in Dakar on 2 April 2012. 
21
 Issued at Maputo, Mozambique on 14 January 2010. SADC website: <www.sadc.int/index/browse/page/672> 
(accessed 12 May 2012). 
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partners, to support SADC’s efforts to promote and sustain democracy in the region in general and 
Madagascar in particular”. Further, the Summit had also rejected “the unilateral plan of the ‘de 
facto’ Government of Madagascar to ‘reorganize’ the transition and hold legislative elections in 
March 2010, and [urged] the international community to also reject it”. 
 
 
Closely knit family-like organisations that are characterised by shared histories, traditions, language 
and aspirations – such as the Commonwealth Organization – have a much better chance of securing 
adherence to their values and principles. The Harare Commonwealth Declaration
22
 intimately 
commits States Parties to “the rule of law and independence of the judiciary”.23 It is one of the 
Commonwealth’s standing commitments that is traceable to earlier Declarations of the organisation, 
including the 1971 Declaration of Commonwealth Principles.
24
 This requirement adds a vital layer 
of significance to SADC States’ rule of law credentials because it is also one of its own cardinal 
principles.
25
 Universal recognition and appeal, at least in theory, of the requirement of the rule of 
law is evident also in the African Charter of Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR)26 and other 
regional human rights treaty agreements,
27
 and in relevant UN human rights treaties and 
documents.
28
  
 
2. SADC’s Credentials on the Rule of Law and the Independence of the Judiciary 
 
At the core of the suspension of the SADC Tribunal in August 2010
29
 is the question whether the 
SADC has begun a retreat from the principle of the rule of law. The preamble of the SADC Treaty 
talks of the need to “guarantee democratic rights, observance of human rights and the rule of law”. 
                                                 
22
 20 October 1991. See Commonwealth Organization website:  
http://www.thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/35468/35773/harare.htm (accessed 12 May 2012) 
23
 Ibid., para.9 
24
 Singapore. See Commonwealth Organization website: 
</www.thecommonwealth.org/document/181889/34293/35468/declarations/>  (accessed 12 May 2012). 
25
 Article 4(c). 
26 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26 June 1981, Banjul, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev 5, 21 
International Legal Materials 59. 
27
 See also Treaty Establishing a Single Council and a Single Commission of the European Communities (The Merger 
Treaty) UKTS 1 (1973) Part II, Cmnd. 5179-II; Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community (EEC) 25 
March 1957, Rome, UKTS 15 (1979) Cmnd. 7480, 298 UNTS 11; Treaty on European Union (TEU) 7 February 1992, 
Maastricht, UKTS 12 (1994) Cm. 2485, 31 International Legal Materials 247; Treaty Establishing the African 
Economic Community (AEC) 3 January 1991, Abuja, 30 International Legal Materials 1245; American Convention on 
Human Rights, 22 November 1969, San Jose,  PAUTS 36, 9 International Legal Materials 67; Treaty Establishing the 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa(COMESA) 5 November 1993, Kampala, 33 International Legal 
Materials 1067. 
28
 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/811; International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, 16 December 1966, New York, Annex to UN Gen. Ass. Res. 2200 (XXI) GAOR, 21st Sess. Supp. 16, 
p. 49, UKTS 6 (1977) Cmnd. 6702; International Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination, 
UK Treaty Series, Misc. No. 77, 1969; UN General Assembly Resolution 2547 (XXIV) 15 December 1969. 
29
 Communique of the 30th
 
Jubilee Summit of Heads of State and Government, 17 August 2010. 
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Article 4 lists as one of the key principles governing the organisation, the duty of Member States 
Parties to act in accordance with “human rights, democracy and the rule of law”.  
 
Moreover, the constitutive treaty of the organisation includes individuals’ human rights guarantees 
against the State. Article 6 provides that: “SADC and Member States shall not discriminate against 
any person on grounds of gender, religion, political views, race, ethnic origin, culture, ill health, 
disability, or such other ground as may be determined by the Summit”. This leads to no other 
conclusion than that the SADC has embraced the rule of law as one of its basic norms. The majority 
of SADC States are signatories to the Harare Commonwealth Declaration issued by Heads of 
Government.
30
 This agreement is habitually credited with setting the Commonwealth on a new 
course of “promoting democracy and good governance, human rights and the rule of law, gender 
equality and sustainable economic and social development”.31  On 29 November 2009, the 
Commonwealth Organization reinforced these values to all its Member States Parties by adopting 
the Declaration on the Affirmation of Commonwealth Values and Principles.
32
 
 
SADC States are also Parties to the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.33 Articles 1(7) 
and 26 of the Charter in particular commit Members States Parties to ensure judicial independence 
and the rule of law on their territories. To emphasise the centrality of the principle of judicial 
independence to all of its functions, the primary enforcer of the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights, the African Commission,34 observed the following in Civil Liberties Organisation 
v. Nigeria:
35
 
A government that governs truly in the best interest of the people … should have no fears of an independent 
judiciary. The judiciary and the executive branch of government should be partners in the good ordering of 
society. For a government to oust the jurisdiction of the courts on a broad scale reflects a lack of confidence in 
the justifiability of its own actions, and a lack of confidence in the courts to act in accordance with the public 
interest and the rule of law. 
 
The Vice Chairperson of the African Commission writes that:
36
 
                                                 
30
 Commonwealth Organization website: <www.thecommonwealth.org/Templates/Internal.asp?NodeID=34457> 
(accessed 12 May 2012). 
31
 Ibid.  
32
 See Declaration on the Affirmation of Commonwealth Values and Principles, para. 5, Commonwealth website: 
<www.thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/35468/216908/commonwealth_values_and_principles.htm> (accessed 
12 May 2012)  
33
 African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 26 June 1981, Banjul, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/67/3/Rev 5, 21 
International Legal Materials 59. 
34
 Article 2 of the Protocol which provides for the relationship with the African Court of Human and Peoples’ Rights 
only gives the Court a complementary role to the African Commission.  
35
 Communication No. 129/94. 
36
 M. Mumba, ‘The Independence of the Judiciary through the eyes of the African Commission on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights’, Paper presented at the symposium on Strengthening the Independence, Impartiality and Accountability of the 
Judiciary in the context of Lesotho organized by the International Commission of Jurists in 
conjunction with the Judiciary of Lesotho 4–5 March 2010, Maseru, Lesotho, 2010. 
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If we accept, as we should, that the judiciary is the custodian of the rule of law and justice in any country we 
should have no difficulty in asserting that the concept of the dependence of the judiciary is an important facet 
of the doctrine of separation of powers of the three branches of government. 
 
 
Thus, by chocking off the SADC Tribunal, a key institution of the organisation as envisage by the 
constitutive treaty in Article 9(1)(g), the Summit of Heads of States or Government may also have 
dropped its rule of law credentials during the storm resulting from the SADC Tribunal’s 
controversial attempt to preside over policy issues that are the proper domain of the executive. By 
suspending the Tribunal, whatever their pretext to that action, the Summit of Heads of State or 
Government have restricted the idea of an independent judiciary that most of them have subscribed 
to through their membership of the following in particular: SADC Treaty, Commonwealth 
Organization and African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights. For the reasons mentioned above, 
these commitments are arguably perceptibly closer to the considerations of SADC States than the 
UN based ones.
37
 They lead to no other conclusion than that the SADC Member States Parties 
closely recognise the requirements of the rule of law, including judicial independence, as the only 
basis upon which their affairs are hinged.    
 
In M v. Home Office
38
 the Home Secretary was held to be in contempt of Court for disobeying a 
judge’s order to return to London a Zairean teacher that had sought asylum in England. The Court 
emphasised the inviolable significance of the separation of powers in constitutional provisions of 
free societies. Nolan LJ stated: “The proper constitutional relationship of the Executive with the 
Courts is that the Courts will respect all acts of the Executive within its lawful presence, and the 
Executive will respect all decisions of the Courts as to what its lawful province is.”39 
 
Assuming there is a basis for it, the reaction of the Summit of Heads of State or Government to the 
SADC Tribunal’s decisions regarding the application of Article 6(2) of the SADC Treaty to Land 
Reform Programmes (LRPs) raises the further question of what if any is the proper function of 
human rights courts in transitional States that manifest the following: 
 
i) A genuine desire to embrace the rule of law principle? 
ii) An urgent need to correct the salient legacy of apartheid on their territories? 
 
 
                                                 
37
 See also ‘United Nations Background Note: The Independence of the Judiciary: A Human Rights Priority’, 
UN website: <www.un.org/rights/dpi1837e.htm> (accessed 12 May 2012); Articles 8 and 10 of Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights, 10 December 1948, UN Doc. A/811.  
38
 [1992] QB 270. 
39
 Ibid., p.314. 
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3. Rule of Law, Independence of the Judiciary, and the Sudden Suspension of the SADC 
Tribunal 
The Protocol on the SADC Tribunal was adopted on 7 August 2000 by the Heads of State or 
Government in accordance with Article 16(2) of the SADC Treaty.
40
 Annexed to the Protocol are 
the Rules of Procedure which form an integral part of the Protocol.
41
 By a communiqué issued at 
the end of the 30th Jubilee Summit of SADC Heads of State or Government held in Windhoek, 
Namibia from 16–17 August 2010, the supreme executive institution of the SADC announced the 
suspension of the SADC Tribunal, and prohibited it from hearing or receiving new petitions while 
its role, functions and terms of reference were reviewed.
42
 At the time of the suspension were four 
pending cases. The suspension is linked to the Zimbabwean government’s refusal to comply with 
the Tribunal’s rulings in favour of white commercial farmers that had challenged the 
constitutionality under the SADC Treaty of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 
which refers to acquisition of farmland for distribution to formerly dispossessed landless Africans.  
 
In its reaction to the SADC Tribunal’s rulings on disputes brought by commercial farmers resisting 
land redistribution,
43
 the Zimbabwean government had called the Court a “day-dreamer” that was 
engaged in an “exercise in futility”. Tanzanian President Jakaya Kikwete is reported to have 
remarked to fellow heads of SADC States several years earlier that in creating the Tribunal they had 
created a monster that would “devour us all”.44 Respected retired High Court judge Justice Simbi 
Mubako called for an enquiry into the creation of the SADC Tribunal “to establish its real motives. 
… [It is] ... a kangaroo court and a comedy. … In my opinion, an enquiry is called for to determine 
who was responsible (for its creation) and why?”45 This level of aversion to a core institution of an 
emerging supranational organisation is unheard of. But why? 
 
Of the first 19 cases brought before the Tribunal, 11 had been brought against the Zimbabwean 
government, mostly in relation to the country’s on-going land reform programme.46 Zimbabwe’s 
land reform programme is an example of a social justice initiative, premised on the Constitution of 
Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 that came into force in 2005. Its intended purpose is the correction 
of the continuing effects of colonial constitutional land laws like the Land Apportionment Act 
                                                 
40
 See <www.thecommonwealth.org/document/34293/39455/141099/harare_declaration.htm> (accessed 12 May 2012). 
41
 Article 23 of the Protocol provides: “ the Rules annexed to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof”. 
42
 Communique of the 30th
 
Jubilee Summit of Heads of State and Government, 17 August 2010. 
43
  See especially Campbell case, 48 ILM 534 (2009). 
44
 ‘Killing the Monster’, Africa News website: <www.newsafrica.net/en/news/1565/killing-the-monster.html> 
(accessed 12 May 2012). 
45
 ‘Justice: Call for Inquiry into SADC Tribunal’, Afriquejet website: <www.afriquejet.com/justice-call-for-inquiry-
into-sadc-tribunal-2011060314104.html> (accessed 12 May 2012). 
46
 P. N. Ndlovu, ‘Campbell v Republic of Zimbabwe: A moment of truth for the SADC Tribunal’, 1 SADC Law Journal 
(2011) p. 63. 
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(1930), which had reserved 30 per cent of all agricultural land for the 1.1 million Africans and 51 
per cent of all agricultural land for the 50,000 whites, and the Land Tenure Act (1969), which had 
reinforced land classification into African and European areas. One immediate effect of these 
colonial constitutional land laws was that by 1960 more than 25,000 black families had been 
reduced to squatters. By 1976 a total of 4.5 million native blacks had been forced to crowd in the 
infertile, drought prone Tribal Trust Lands.
47
  
 
It is plain to see that in addressing the 11 or so cases brought against Zimbabwe’s on-going land 
reform programme, the Tribunal had taken the view that it was constrained only by the provisions 
of the SADC Treaty and its Protocols. However, the unfavourable reaction of the SADC Member 
States Parties to the outcomes of those cases, culminating in the suspension of the Tribunal, 
confirmed at least four things. One is the indisputable status of black economic empowerment 
(BEE) as a new regional constitutional norm of customary international law on reconciliation and 
social reconstruction.
48
 Its purpose is twofold. One is to undo the social, economic and 
psychological legacy of apartheid in the SADC. The other is to substitute equality for all under 
majority rule governments for inequality on racial grounds under apartheid. Although the BEE 
norm might have materialised well after the SADC Treaty of 1992, it appears to hold at the very 
least the status of lex specialis on land use in the SADC.   
 
Further, Member States Parties of the SADC probably expected and will expect in future that the 
Tribunal will take account of all relevant sub-regional constitutional customary law norms in the 
determination of matters presented to it. In particular, by suspending the Tribunal, they have 
established the significance of BEE as a norm of regional constitutional law for all to see, including 
the suspended Tribunal itself. Thirdly, the Tribunal cannot interpret provisions of the SADC Treaty 
with regard to the current context only as it sought to do in the leading case of Campbell.
49
 Rather 
the Tribunal had been expected, and will be expected to, interpret provisions of the SADC Treaty or 
its Protocols in light of the region’s underlying context too. Perhaps, Member States Parties of the 
SADC had also hoped that the Tribunal would realise the policy nature of the land issues of the 
                                                 
47
 B. Chigara, ‘Southern African Development Community (SADC) tribunal: Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd and Others v. 
Republic of Zimbabwe: introductory note’, 48:3 International Legal Materials (2009) pp. 530–531. 
48
 See also BBC Hardtalk: Interview with President FW de Klerk (18 April 2012), President of South Africa (1989–
1994); see also B. Chigara, ‘European/Southern African Development Community (SADC) States’ bilateral investment 
agreements (BITs) for the promotion and protection of foreign investments v. post-apartheid SADC economic and 
social reconstruction policy’, 10:3 Journal of International Trade Law and Policy (2011) pp. 213–242. 
49
  48 ILM 534 (2009). 
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SADC and immediately declined jurisdiction to consider them. The validity of any such 
suppositions is examined in detail below. 
 
4. The SADC Tribunal and the Zimbabwean Courts: Jurisdiction and Separation of Powers? 
 
In Etheredge v. Minister of State for National Security Responsible for Lands, Land Reform and 
Resettlement,
50
 the applicant had argued that the Zimbabwe High Court’s jurisdiction to continue 
with the matter had been superseded by the SADC Tribunal, which had already passed an interim 
judgment against Zimbabwe in that connection.  
 
Gowora J. disagreed. He stated that: 
The Treaty makes provision for the establishment of a tribunal. The Protocol is the document that then sets up 
the tribunal and provides for the powers of the Tribunal. I have examined the protocol very carefully and I 
have not observed therein any reference to the courts of any of the countries within SADC. If indeed the 
intention was to create a tribunal which would be superior to the courts in the subscribing countries that intent 
is not manifest in the document presented to me. The supreme law in this jurisdiction is our Constitution and it 
has not made provision for these courts to be subject to the (SADC) Tribunal. This court is a court of superior 
jurisdiction and has an inherent jurisdiction over all people and all matters in the country, and its jurisdiction 
can only be ousted by a statutory provision to that effect. I do not have placed before me any statute to that 
effect and the protocol certainly does not do that.
51 
 
Etheredge followed a long list of cases culminating in the Supreme Court decision in Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU) and Others v. The Minister of Lands and Rural resettlement and Others 
(Zimbabwe) (2010) in which Zimbabwean courts had declined competence to entertain challenges 
to Zimbabwean Constitution Amendment Act 17 in observance of the doctrine of separation of 
powers. Chidyausiku C.J. stated that former owners and/or occupiers whose land had been acquired 
by the acquiring authority in terms of Section 16 B(2)(a) of the Constitution of Zimbabwe could not  
challenge the legality of such acquisition in a court of law. This is because the jurisdiction of the 
courts has been ousted by Section 16 B(3)(a) of the Constitution.
52
 Thirdly, it recognises and 
emphasises the political nature of the land issue and locks it away from judicial scrutiny by virtue of 
its qualities. Support for this approach of distinguishing justiciable judicial matters from non-
justiciable policy matters is ubiquitous. 
 
In Lindiwe Mazibuko and Others v. City of Johannesburg and Others,
53
 a case that dealt with the 
constitutional guarantee to access to water,
54
 the Constitutional Court of South Africa observed that 
                                                 
50
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51
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52
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the question that the parties had variously presented as a matter for the determination of the extent 
of the State’s obligation under Section 27(1)(b) and Section 27(2) of the South African Constitution 
actually required the Court to pronounce on executive policy matters – something that it was not 
competent or willing to do.  
 
The Court unequivocally warned that it was ill-suited and reluctant to adjudicate upon issues that 
would undermine the functional balance contemplated by the constitutional allocation of separate 
competences between the judiciary, legislature and the executive. The Court prefaced its 
pronouncements on the matter with what it called “the proper role of Courts in a constitutional 
democracy”55 and added that “[c]ourts are ill-suited to adjudicate upon issues where Court Orders 
could have multiple social and economic consequences for the Community”.56 The Court divorced 
itself from policy making affairs of the State and summarised its reasoning as follows: 
 
 It is institutionally inappropriate for a Court to determine precisely what the achievement of any particular 
social and economic right entails and what steps government should take to ensure the progressive realisation 
of the right. This is a matter, in the first place, for the legislature and executive, the institutions of government 
best placed to investigate social conditions in the light of available budgets and to determine what targets are 
achievable in relation to social and economic rights. Indeed, it is desirable as a matter of democratic 
accountability that they should do so for it is their programmes and promises that are subjected to democratic 
popular choice.
57  
 
The long and short of it is that it is not the function of courts to either draft governmental policy or 
to determine its content,
58
 which is what the SADC Tribunal appears to have sought to achieve in 
Campbell.
59
 Thus, the mere presence of competing legal claims may not be sufficient to qualify a 
dispute as justiciable. Justiciable disputes are those disputes that lend themselves to an acceptance by 
the disputants of a judicial finding.  
 
In ex parte Dyer (1994) Simon Brown L.J. stated that: “Matters of national policy are not open to 
challenge before the Courts other than on the basis of bad faith, improper motive or manifest 
                                                                                                                                                                  
54
 Section 27(1) provides that: “Everyone has the right to have access to: (a) health care services, including reproductive 
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paragraph 1 (a-c)”. 
55
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56
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57
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absurdity. Matters of national economic policy are for political – not judicial judgment”.60 This is 
because the doctrine of separation of powers applies to exclude from judicial scrutiny matters of 
public policy. Judicial attempt to control such policy decisions is rare and when it occurs it is 
always regarded as an intrusion into the proper decision making competence of the executive – 
GCHQ case.
61
  
5. Emergent Regional Constitutional Customary Law as Lex Specialis and the SADC Treaty 
and its Protocols: What Applies When and What Does Not Apply When and Why? 
The findings against the application of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17, which 
authorises the government to seize land for redistribution to dispossessed peasants, begs the 
question whether the SADC Constitution is both comprehensive, compact and static; or whether 
like other constitutions, it is an organic and evolving body of norms that both responds to, and 
maintains and shapes, peace and security under the rule of law principle.  In this connection, the 
primary test for the SADC’s present constitutional arrangements is whether they are fitting and 
resilient enough to ensure the least painful path away from apartheid’s debilitating social, economic 
and psychological legacy of inequality based along racial lines, to egalitarian rule. It has been 
argued that apartheid had resulted in semi-authentic beings that could not pursue self-actualisation 
whether they were the beneficiaries of the system or victims of its brutality.
62
  Even Nobel Laureate 
F.W. De Klerk, President of South Africa (1989–1994), maintains to this day that apartheid was not 
then, and is not now, a repugnant idea. The one white leader that probably did the most to end 
apartheid in South Africa claims that it was for other reasons, and nothing to do with the immorality 
of the idea. It had become unworkable!  “There are three reasons it (apartheid) failed. It failed 
because the whites wanted to keep too much land for themselves.  It failed because we (whites and 
blacks) became economically integrated, and it failed because the majority of blacks said that is not 
how we want our rights.”63 His justifications for a system that the UN has criminalised through its 
most elite category of norms – jus cogens – highlights the extent of the challenge facing anyone 
tasked with undoing the legacy of apartheid. 
 
More importantly, the framers of the 1992 constitutive treaty of the SADC could not have 
imagined, or foreseen, all the scenarios that would require the Tribunal’s determination. Therefore, 
                                                 
60
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the principles enunciated in that document will require supplementing and adjustment in order to 
ensure efficiency of the system intended. For this reason, the Tribunal must fill in the gaps as they 
arise. Resort to regional customary international law in the same way that domestic courts resort to 
common law principles when statute falls short is a sure way forward. Failing that, the Tribunal 
ought to declare appropriately a state of non-liquet or decline jurisdiction on account of the policy 
nature of disputes similar to the land issue.  
 
6. Regional Customary International Law (CIL) and the Interpretation of the SADC Treaty 
 
To establish a system that sufficiently and efficiently addresses transitional States of the SADC’s 
challenges relating to the legacy of apartheid, the SADC Tribunal must, in addition to 
distinguishing between justiciable judicial disputes and non-justiciable policy matters,
64
 take into 
consideration applicable norms of regional customary international law. This approach has the 
benefit of protecting the judiciary from needless confrontation with relevant policy goals of the 
Summit of Heads of State or Government. The latter are at liberty also to establish their 
constitutional preferences through CIL. Efficient interpretation of the 1992 SADC Treaty should 
lead to a place where the law serves the SADC Community by facilitating Member States Parties’ 
transition to more egalitarian societies. According to the 15th Supreme Court Chief Justice of the 
United States of America (1969–1986), “[t]he obligation of our profession is to serve as healers of 
human conflict. To fulfil our traditional obligation means that we should provide mechanisms that 
can produce an acceptable result in the shortest possible time, with the least possible expense and 
with the minimum of stress on the participants. That is what justice is all about!”65 
 
The case for integrating CIL into the interpretation of the SADC Treaty is mandated by the organic 
nature of all societies and examples of how similar Courts have dealt with similar challenges. Quick 
changes in social attitudes, expectations and even fear of change itself can impose on policy makers 
the need to make rapid and radical policy changes not previously imagined or contemplated by 
framers of the constitution. Progressive and flexible interpretation of the same becomes 
mandatory.
66
 According to Lord Sankey, the constitution cannot be interpreted in the same way as 
an ordinary statute. Rather, it must be read within the context of society to ensure that it adapts and 
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reflects changes. If constitutional interpretation adheres to the framers’ intent, and remains rooted in 
the past, it would fall into disuse on account of its failure to reflect society.
67
 
 
But has a regional customary international law norm evolved since 1992 to complement or even 
suggest a possible amendment to the constitutive SADC Declaration and Treaty of 1992, which the 
Tribunal ought to be mindful of when determining matters presented to it? SADC States appear to 
have latterly instituted black economic empowerment constitutional pieces of national legislation to 
address the salient, resilient and provocative social, economic and psychological legacy of apartheid 
rule for nearly a century on their territories. This development has been either unambiguously 
supported
68
 or acquiesced with by other Member States Parties of the SADC?
69
 A regional 
constitutional customary international law norm on reconciliation and social reconstruction appears 
to have crystallised in the SADC. It appears to pass the Asylum case test of “specially affected State 
practice” in that it has been championed by the specially affected States of South Africa, Zimbabwe 
and Namibia. It has been endorsed by their co-Member States Parties of the SADC. It has also been 
embraced by stakeholders in the form of multinational corporations such as Shell. These companies 
now operate BEE scorecards as
70
 an index of their performance in light of governmental policies. 
 
Notwithstanding the weaknesses complained about Article 38(1)(b)’s71 law-making process in 
international law, including uncertainty,
72
 in the threshold of State practice and opinio juris required 
to confirm the emergence of a norm of customary international law,
73
 and imprecision in the timing 
of the crystallisation of the nascent norm into a binding norm,
74
 this development is said to have 
contributed to the emergence of a constitutional regional customary international law norm 
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authorising a form of reverse discrimination in order to counter the salient economic and social 
legacy of apartheid.  
 
However, such a development would possibly contradict Article 6 of the constitutive SADC Treaty 
which guarantees individual protection from racial discrimination. At the very least, it would 
require a determination on which prevails between two constitutional norms. Minimally, it raises 
the question of whether lex specialis
75
 on land relations, deriving from custom can override the 
more definite and more certain treaty guarantees listed in the SADC Treaty itself.  
 
These scenarios point to what Albert Thomas described as the deceptive and “capricious and 
fantastic play of constitutional texts and social realities [because] … the texts often continue to exist 
when the reality has become something quite different”.76 This is because the new social reality 
among SADC States that finally suspended the SADC Tribunal in protest at its decisions against the 
Zimbabwean government’s land reform programme approves a form of reverse discrimination in 
favour of victims of apartheid. This is evident in the SADC’s black economic empowerment 
programmes championed by the worst affected States, namely South Africa, Zimbabwe and 
Namibia and supported or acquiesced to by other SADC States Parties. Therefore, in the cases that 
referred to the application of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 of 2005, the SADC 
Tribunal might have erred by ignoring this reality. 
 
Emergent scholarly writings on the suspension of the SADC Tribunal clearly show a divide 
between legal positivists that prioritise enforcement of Community values and SADC Treaty 
precepts on the one hand, and critical legal scholars that tend to emphasise the significance of social 
justice reform programmes and the law’s “duty” to recognise and ensure their protection.  
 
7. Inter-Human Rights Discourses  
 
Whether in Europe, Africa or the Americas, human rights courts and tribunals, regardless of their 
designation,
77
 all habitually cross reference their opinions against one another on points of law. For 
instance in the recent case of Al-Skeini v. United Kingdom (2011)
78
 the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) in Strasbourg referred also to the reasoning of the International Court of Justice in 
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the case of Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) 
v. Uganda) (2005)
79
 and of the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the case of Mapiripán 
Massacre v. Colombia (2005).
80
  
 
In the much publicised
81
 Campbell case
82
 – a very brief judgment – the SADC Tribunal cross 
referenced its opinions in aid of its reasoning to the European Court of Human Rights; the Inter 
American Court of Human Rights; the UK House of Lords; the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa; the African Commission on Human Rights; the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights; the Universal Declaration of Human Rights; the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples’ Rights; and the UN Human Rights Committee. Such a broad referencing of other human 
rights judicial institutions and universal human rights treaties and regional human rights instruments 
and their institutions confirms a unity of purpose in time. It also presumes certain qualities about the 
experiences of the communities they serve. However, as the analysis below shows, such 
presumptions can be dangerously misplaced, even misleading, and therefore to be made with great 
care.  
 
8. On Human Rights Discourse Transplants 
Otto Kahn-Freund, sometime Professor of Comparative Law at Oxford, writes that the “use of 
foreign models as instruments of social or cultural change raises most sharply the problem of 
transplantation”.83 Political differentiation is critical to effective transplantations of legal insights 
from institutions foreign to those of the SADC under the comparative approach. Current socio-
economic challenges that are vying for judicial attention of national and regional institutions in the 
SADC bear a strong resemblance perhaps to the German situation at the end of World War II and 
upon the re-unification of that country in 1990. The question raised at each of those two points was 
this: How should a new political order deal with outcomes of the perished order previous to it?  If 
this is correct, then, the SADC Tribunal should, to the extent that it would seek to rely on the 
comparative approach to judicial prognosis, compare its approaches to those of the Federal 
Constitutional Court of Germany while it was addressing similar challenges. Current jurisprudence 
of other foreign courts could not be said to be emerging from similar circumstances. Therefore, 
their social relevance to the current SADC reality does not in earnest exist.   
 
                                                 
79
 Unreported 19 December 2005. 
80
 Unreported 15 September 2005.  
81
 A film has resulted, ‘Mugabe and the White African’, (2010, L. Bailey and A. Thompson). 
82
  48 ILM 534 (2009) 
83
 O. Kahn-Freund, ‘On uses and misuses of comparative law’, 37 Modern Law Review (1974) p. 5. 
 Page | 17 
 
Alexy
84
 offers lucid insights into German handling of this question first in the aftermath of the fall 
of the Reich and secondly following the re-unification of Germany.  The question in each case was 
how the new order should deal with outcomes of false laws of the preceding order. But even 
without the collapse of a regime, a legal system can evolve rapidly and result in seismic conceptual 
changes that may create enormous challenges for addressees of the legal system. As an instance, 
international law’s recent rejection of the fiction of terra nullius85 as a justification for the 
continued alienation of native indigenous peoples from lands confiscated from them upon 
colonisation appears to have opened a can of worms that affected States are finding to be extremely 
problematic. The Supreme Court of Australia
86
 has admirably responded to the former question in 
that context. Several cases of property rights filed at the SADC Tribunal against Zimbabwe invoke 
the same question with specific regard to the legacy of colonial constitutional land laws.  Those 
laws were the result of apartheid – a system of governance that international law had also found to 
be so repugnant to human nature that it criminalised it in the end
87
 by way of jus cogens, the most 
elite category of norms of international law.
88
  
 
Another question that the initial question triggered for the SADC was that of judicial thoroughness. 
Although the Tribunal had noted in the well-publicised case of Campbell
89
 that Zimbabwe’s land 
issues have a long history, it had limited its considerations to “current applicable history” without 
regard whatsoever to the “underlying past history” of colonial confiscation and enslavement of 
natives. This is a matter of public record. That current history was drawn from the SADC Treaty 
itself and pointed to the restrictions against racial discrimination that the Treaty imposes upon 
Member States Parties. From that perspective, the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment 17 of 
2005 appears ultra vires, i.e. beyond the constitutional capacity of the Zimbabwean government 
when taken in conjunction with Zimbabwe’s obligations under the SADC Treaty.  
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However, as the Supreme Court of Australia’s decision in Mabo No.290 shows, the SADC 
Tribunal’s approach was both narrow and simplistic. It demonstrates shocking resort to textual 
constitutionalism. Unfettered textual constitutionalism can result in social irrelevance for failing to 
adjust to new realities such as those strongly suggested by the SADC States’ inauguration of the 
regional constitutional norm of customary international law on reconciliation, economic and social 
reconstruction for the purpose of undoing the social and economic legacy of apartheid rule on their 
territories. Zimbabwe’s Act 17 of 2005 is based also on the need to address the long and underlying 
historical claims of native indigenous entitlement to the disputed lands that are directly linked to 
European settlers’ conquest of 1890 and the subsequent confiscation of their lands.  
 
History
91
 and context are as much a basis for judicial pronouncements as the philosophical 
principles that a court may seek to apply to a dispute.
92
 Current history alone may not suffice in 
matters relating to the dominant tools of economic practice in predominantly agricultural societies 
that have suffered the indignities of both colonisation and later apartheid consecutively. This is 
because prior to the creation of apartheid law based legal titles to the SADC’s disputed lands, other 
titles existed. Apartheid constitutional laws’ treatment of previous indigenous titles and the manifest 
outcome of that treatment is itself indicative of the possible uses of constitutional authority in any 
State. If SADC States are sovereign independent States, then they also possess exactly the same 
constitutional competence as predecessor apartheid governments had to allocate land rights. Thus, 
the SADC Tribunal’s finding in Campbell93 recommends the view that: 
 
1) Apartheid constitutional land laws that had alienated native indigenous peoples of their 
lands without compensation were still perfectly valid in the majority rule dispensation; and  
2) Majority rule constitutional land laws lacked the quality that the enduring apartheid 
constitutional land laws had and still wield. 
 
                                                 
90
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Nonetheless, SADC Sates’ inauguration of black economic empowerment as a regional norm of 
customary international law
94
 shows three things which the SADC Tribunal appeared to miss. The 
first is majority rule governments’ own conviction in their own competence to address land issues 
even with norms of similar quality to those that apartheid governments had previously relied upon 
to confiscate and alienate native Africans’ land. In this sense the SADC Tribunal’s reasoning is 
vulnerable from charges of false appearances of constitutionalism because majority rule 
governments have as much sovereign competence as their predecessor apartheid governments to 
legislate on any subject on their territories subject only to the requirements of general international 
law. SADC constitutional laws include also basic SADC customary international laws.  
 
The second is majority rule governments’ deliberate creation of a lex specialis that targets the 
economic and social legacy of apartheid rule. Lex specialis is Latin for “law governing a specific 
subject matter”. It derives from the maxim “lex specialis derogat legi generali” or a “special rule 
prevails over a general rule”.95 The doctrine applies to the interpretation of laws regardless of 
jurisdiction. It requires priority to be given to a law governing a specific subject matter (in this case 
land disputes) over a law that only governs general matters (such as Article 6 of the SADC Treaty), 
particularly where the competing standards are of equal stature. Shaw writes that lex specialis 
derogates from general law or lex generalis “so that the more detailed and specific rule will have 
priority”.96 It matters not that the lex specialis is customary international law while the general norm 
is a treaty provision. Shaw writes that regarding the question of priority as between custom and 
treaty is resolved by the general rule, “that which is later in time will have priority”.97  
 
Moreover, where the lex specialis appears in double versions, both as treaty and custom, there 
should be no presumption that the latter is subsumed by the former. The two may co-exist.
98
 
Therefore, it is extremely curious that the land jurisprudence of the SADC Tribunal consistently 
privileged the lex generalis provisions of Article 6(2)
99
 of the sub-regional SADC Treaty adopted in 
1992 over the sub-regional customary international law norm crystallised by the simultaneous and 
compulsive promulgation in the last two decades  of national statutes and regulations and the setting 
of whole governmental departments, and standing progress evaluation conferences, and scorecard 
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committees to oversee and ensure black economic empowerment.
100
 Indeed, the inauguration of 
BEE by SADC States as a basic norm for addressing the legacy of apartheid, long after their 
adoption
101
 and coming into force
102
 of the SADC Treaty, recommends the view that the SADC 
Treaty should be interpreted and applied in light of the newer constitutional customary international 
law BEE norm and social realities in the region.  
 
Albert Thomas
103
 observed that this is the only way of ensuring legitimacy for those whose task it is 
to interpret constitutional texts such as the SADC Treaty. This is because texts often continue to 
exist when the reality has become something quite different. 
 
 Institutions are living things. All codification is abstract. Jurists have long ceased to confine themselves to 
studying the mechanical operation of institutions and laws. They seek to discover in each succeeding epoch the 
social reality which these embody. This method is just as applicable to newly-established institutions as to 
those which have ceased to be anything but a matter of history.
104
 
 
Thirdly, the SADC Tribunal’s emergent jurisprudence on the question of the validity of 
constitutional land law statutes of Member States Parties also appears to oppose Member States 
Parties’ basic policy of reconciliation, reconstruction and the pursuit of equality. SADC States have 
inaugurated this standard both as a basic norm
105
 and mechanism for dealing with the social and 
political legacy of apartheid on their territories. 
 
The way other courts have historically responded to the initial question of whether legal validity 
should continue to be attached to something that had offended against universally recognised 
fundamental principles of justice and the rule of law, even though it had been legally valid in 
respect of the positive laws of a preceding, is relevant to the SADC Tribunal’s effort regarding land 
disputes, if at all they fall into its proper sphere of operation.
106
  Because in general courts are 
reticent to adjudicate over public policy matters – a preserve of executive power –  this article 
argues that if at all land issues properly fall under the competence of the Tribunal, then the best 
approach is not its literal textual interpretation of basic provisions of the 1992 Treaty, but what I 
call the ‘due-account approach’.  
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The latter approach takes due regard of two things. One is SADC States’ recent inauguration of 
reconciliation, reconstruction and the pursuit of equality as a regional norm of customary 
international law.
107
 The other is the mandatory requirement to consider CIL’s position on the 
matter. Only in this way can the Tribunal ensure against legal intolerability in the Radbruch 
sense.
108
 Legal intolerability is reached when the contradiction between positive law and justice 
reaches an intolerable level and the law becomes a “false law” from justice’s perspective. Legalised 
injustice occurs “[w]here justice is not even aimed at, where equality – the core of justice – is 
deliberately disavowed in the enactment of a positive law, then the law is not simply ‘false law’, it 
has no claim at all to legal status”.109  
 
If the law is that which is appropriately enacted and is socially effective, only when the threshold of 
extreme injustice is crossed do appropriately enacted and socially effective norms such as apartheid 
constitutional land laws that confiscated from indigenous natives of the SADC their land and 
compelled them to become wage earners on newly developed European enterprises then lose their 
legal validity under Radbruch’s formula110 because of law’s association with objectivity, fairness 
and justice. Apartheid regimes’ expropriation of black lands without compensation in the SADC is 
well documented.
111
 Judicial institutions’ support of those laws is also well documented.  
 
Professor Kader Asmal has observed that apartheid judges were themselves “prime movers in the 
conversion of law to the ends of violence and lawlessness. ... [T]he apartheid judiciary has much 
responsibility to shoulder for the ills of the past – and could have done much to enlighten the 
country about the inner workings of apartheid’s administrative labyrinth.”112 Revulsion against the 
practice of both the apartheid legislators and apartheid’s judicial bodies is also well documented.113  
 
Presently, this raises the question of how the relevant judicial institutions should respond to claims 
of blacks that they want their land back, which commercial farmers claim is nonsense because they 
own the land? At the heart of this question is the question whether what was legal under apartheid 
rule could remain legal today even though it lacked validity under Radbruch’s false law principle, 
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eventually manifested in the rapture of apartheid rule itself. This is not a novel question. Twice in 
the last century the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany had to address the same problem. First 
after the Second World War to resolve also property claims of individuals that had been nullified by 
the Reich, and secondly to determine the justifiability of illegal actions resulting in the deaths of 
individuals killed while trying to cross the internal border between East and West Germany.  
 
The difficulties that the SADC Tribunal has encountered with the Summit of Heads of State or 
Government result from its own emergent property rights jurisprudence which is incongruous with 
all of the following: 
i) New regional constitutional norm of customary international law on reconciliation, 
economic and social reconstruction and the requirement of equality. 
ii) History of legal dispossession of native land during apartheid and the requirement of the 
principle of fairness.  
iii) Social and economic reconstruction agenda of the SADC encapsulated in post 1992 regional 
customary international law.  
 
Consequently, it risks fermenting violence in affected States particularly because of its own 
violence on majority rule constitutional land laws that it has rendered completely inapplicable to 
land rights disputes while upholding the effect of apartheid constitutional land laws in affected 
States by shielding them from the possible effects of emergent reconstruction laws. Therefore, the 
Tribunal could not while developing such jurisprudence serve to facilitate reconciliation and 
reconstruction and to repair communities damaged by a century of apartheid policies. 
 
To be of any use to the parties, future jurisprudence of the SADC Tribunal should: 
i) Account for the evolving nature of the SADC constitutional provisions, particularly those 
norms provided for by regional constitutional customary international law. 
ii) Adopt a more flexible teleological interpretation of SADC Constitutional provisions. 
iii) Be mindful of the hazards inherent in legal transplants. In particular, it should recognize that 
it is a transitional Court – practically a vehicle to facilitate departure from the effects of 
the worst form of government ever known to man to a promised better possible one, 
built on equality.  Consequently, any borrowing from other jurisdictions should be 
tempered by the requirement of how similar courts (in temporal context) discharged their 
obligations in transitional settings similar to its own. 
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This should be the minimal duty of a human rights court serving societies in transition from a 
century of apartheid rule to equality.  
 
9. Tribunal’s Duty to Pursue Proportionate Reconciliation and Reconstruction Jurisprudence 
Support for the view that the SADC Tribunal may be under a duty to ensure the development of a 
proportionate reconciliation, reconstruction and pursuit of equality jurisprudence is apparent. Courts 
do not operate in social and political vacuums where legal transplants from other jurisdictions could 
flourish without the inhibitions of context. In fact the decisions of the Constitutional Court of South 
Africa habitually invoke history and context as significant parameters in its decision making 
process.
114
 
 
Parroting of anti-discrimination jurisprudence borrowed from external jurisdictions into the SADC 
without regard to temporal context may prove to be unhelpful because the decisions premised on 
such exercises may conflict with the current legitimate expectations of both the executive and the 
formerly oppressed majority. Such a scenario would facilitate the delivery of useless judicial 
pronouncements that Parties openly disregard. The result, as the suspension of the SADC Tribunal 
has shown, would be that the judicial institution becomes involved in socially irrelevant 
bureaucratic exercises.  
 
Chiding the newly established International Labour Organization (ILO), its illustrious founding 
Secretary General Albert Thomas warned against the “mechanical operation of institutions and 
laws” because of its potential to castrate them of their potential to impact lives and thereby reduce 
their function to bureaucratic exercises. He insisted that the social reality test was the litmus test for 
the legitimacy and significance of any institution – something that the currently suspended SADC 
Tribunal might do well to learn should the SADC States choose to reinstate it. 
The ILO might act in perfect conformity with all the articles of the Treaty [its constitutive Treaty – The Peace treaty of 
Versailles 1918, gave it power to secure as far as possible, equal conditions for all workers of the world by the adoption 
of uniform Draft Conventions and Recommendations]; it might obtain the ratification of every Convention; it might 
distribute throughout the world abundant information; and  nevertheless be nothing but a bureaucratic institution 
without real authority. Its publications would not be read; its recommendations would be treated with indifference; its 
life would be purely formal. 
 
Within the framework of the same constitution, on the other hand, it may come to be regarded by public opinion as a 
beneficient and necessary institution. It may command the attention of governments; its advice and intervention may be 
sought; its operations may furnish the workers whom it protects and the employers who are anxious to secure 
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organisation and stability with opportunities for a continuous effort. A common spirit may be created which will 
animate it from within. It may be the centre of a real and intense international life.
115
 
 
The birth and sudden suspension of the SADC Tribunal shows the Tribunal’s enormous failure 
regarding Albert Thomas’ social relevance requirement.  This is in large part because of the 
Tribunal’s failure to interpret its role among its subjects, particularly in light of SADC States’ 
adoption of reconciliation, economic and social reconstruction, and the requirement of equality as a 
basic norm of regional customary international law. Consequently, the Tribunal has struggled to 
deal with the question of the validity of apartheid-engineered property rights in the post-apartheid 
dispensation. In fact one wonders to what extent the SADC Tribunal manifests the psychological 
legacy of apartheid. It seeks to uphold and legitimise the land thefts of the apartheid era by 
emasculating efforts of majority rule governments to undo those thefts probably because they 
occurred over a century ago. 
 
In Re-crafting the Rule of Law: The Limits of Legal Order, Professor Dyzenhaus painstakingly 
examines case examples to determine whether we should continue to regard as legally valid 
something which had offended against fundamental principles of justice and the rule of law merely 
because it had been legally valid in terms of the positive law of the system of the preceding order.
116
 
The same question applies very much to the SADC land issues of today. The question that the 
Tribunal’s emergent property rights jurisprudence has raised is whether it is ethically sustainable for 
the Tribunal to privilege property rights emanating from apartheid constitutional land laws while 
simultaneously denying the applicability in the same sphere of similar laws of majority rule 
governments that are seeking to reverse confiscation of native black lands under white domination 
and without compensation. 
 
Reconstruction jurisprudence of the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany makes apparent that 
Court’s awareness of the utility of social relevance to its practice. By Section 2 of Decree 11 of the 
Reich’s Citizenship Law of 25 November 1941 a Jewish person lost his citizenship and by 
implication any corresponding property rights if his usual residence was abroad at the time the 
Decree came into force, or whenever he made his usual residence abroad after the coming into force 
of the Decree.  
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The Federal Constitutional Court’s jurisprudence disavowed Decree 11 as false law on account of 
its intolerability or conflict with justice. It stated that the Decree “so evidently contradict[ed] 
fundamental principles of justice that the judge who applied them or recognised their legal 
consequences would pronounce injustice instead of law”.117 If the Court had ruled otherwise, one of 
the applicants, a lawyer that had been deported from Amsterdam in 1942, would have lost his claim 
to his inheritance. The decision served to reconcile the man with his wealth even as an heir. It 
served also to perfect the law’s integrity by rejecting claims that the distortions of entitlement to 
keep property authored under the Reich could be valid in the post-Reich era. It served also to 
extinguish the legacy of confiscation of property belonging to Jewish people.  
 
The German Federal Court’s findings contrast sharply with those of the SADC Tribunal on matters 
of similar significance and weight, particularly in the leading case of Mike Campbell (Pvt) Ltd. and 
Others v. Zimbabwe. The finding of the Tribunal potentially exposes it to criticism regarding three 
salient matters that are pivotal to its purpose in the reconciliation, reconstruction and pursuit of 
equality era.  
 
10. Inherent weaknesses in SADC Tribunal Jurisprudence on land issues in Light of other 
approaches 
 
The first of these criticisms refers to the Tribunal’s assessment118 of the challenge presented by the 
Parties’ dispute. The Tribunal took the simplistic view that this was a question of whether the 
Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 of 2005 breached provisions of the constitutive 
SADC Treaty on anti-discrimination. That assessment contrasts sharply to the German Federal 
Constitutional Court’s reconstruction assessment of the challenge posed by the Parties’ dispute in 
BverfGE after the demise of the Reich. The latter Court, mindful that its social relevance was at 
issue, interpreted the question presented by Applicants as one that required it to consider whether 
one should continue to regard as legally valid something which offended against fundamental 
principles of justice and the rule of law even though it had been legally valid in terms of the positive 
law of the system which had perished.  
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Cognisant of its function to ensure law’s integrity by disavowing intolerability when validly enacted 
laws contradict justice, the German Federal Constitutional Court ruled that Decree 11, regarding the 
Reich’s Citizenship Law of 25 November 1941, was in the reconstruction era null and void. It stated 
that “Decree 11 offends fundamental principles. … [Its] contradiction with justice has reached so 
intolerable a level that it must be regarded as void from the outset.”119  
 
More recently, the UK House of Lords has persistently refused to enforce UK counter-terrorism 
pieces of legislation whose practice would have resulted in foreign terrorist suspects being treated 
less favourably than their British counterparts, an example of the House of Lords disavowing 
intolerability arising from potential enforcement of validly enacted laws to arrive at outcomes that 
would contradict justice. Lord Hoffmann described the relevant sections of the emergent UK 
counter-terrorism pieces of legislation as anathema to the British instincts of justice and 
constitution. He stated:   
The power which the Home Secretary seeks to uphold is a power to detain people indefinitely without charge 
or trial. Nothing could be more antithetical to the instincts and traditions of the people of the United Kingdom. 
At present, the power cannot be exercised against citizens of this country. First, it applies only to foreigners 
whom the Home Secretary would otherwise be able to deport. But the power to deport foreigners is extremely 
wide. Secondly, it requires that the Home Secretary should reasonably suspect the foreigners of a variety of 
activities or attitudes in  connection with terrorism, including supporting a group influenced from abroad 
whom the Home Secretary suspects of being concerned in terrorism. If the finger of suspicion has pointed and 
the suspect is detained, his detention must be reviewed by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission. They 
can decide that there were no reasonable grounds for the Home Secretary's suspicion. But the suspect is not 
entitled to be told the grounds upon which he has been suspected. So he may not find it easy to explain that the 
suspicion is groundless. In any case, suspicion of being a supporter is one thing and proof of wrongdoing is 
another. Someone who has never committed any offence and has no intention of doing anything wrong may be 
reasonably suspected of being a supporter on the basis of some heated remarks overheard in a pub. The 
question in this case is whether the United Kingdom should be a country in which the police can come to such 
a person's house and take him away to be detained indefinitely without trial.
120
 
 
It is to these instincts of justice that courts of law should look to when assessing the substantive 
quality of the questions placed before them. This is because judicial courts have a duty to ensure 
law’s integrity by ensuring against intolerability which results when validly proclaimed laws 
contradict requirements of justice. In particular, affected States of the SADC have to fathom an 
objective and sustainable formula to efficiently eradicate apartheid’s salient legacy of unequal land 
distribution on racial lines and the economic exclusion of the majority black communities.  
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Perhaps some still do believe that the implementation of Rhodesia’s (now Zimbabwe) Land 
Apportionment Act (1930) that had reserved 30 per cent of all agricultural land for the 1.1 million 
blacks and 51 per cent of all agricultural land for the 50,000 whites was not contrary to the principle 
of fairness. And some that the implementation of the Land Husbandry Act (1951) and the Land 
Tenure Act (1969) that had reinforced land classification into African and European areas with the 
result that by 1960 more than 25,000 black families had become squatters on a “communal basis” – 
a condition that had been aggravated by the civil war for independence until 1980 when the first 
majority rule government came to power – was not contrary to fairness. And others that the refusal 
of commercial farmers to make land available to the Zimbabwean government through the willing 
seller willing buyer  policy is not inconsistent with the current policy of reconciliation and 
reconstruction.  
Moreover, under the critical date theory, international law requires that barring application of the 
much diminished doctrine of terra nullius which operates to authorise a State to claim sovereign 
rights over territory that its agents had encountered as vacant and belonging to no one else, any 
competing claims to ownership of territory ought to be settled between the contesting Parties by 
stopping time on that all important significant date to which they both point. “Whatever were the 
Parties’ respective positions and corresponding rights then should be enforced now.”121  
 
It has never been claimed that Zimbabwe was terra nullius at colonisation. That fact was the basis 
upon which blacks had premised their armed liberation struggle on against the settler white regime. 
Therefore, the legal titles that commercial farmers insist upon may not be valid as blacks can point 
to ownership of the same lands before colonisation. In fact this is a matter of historical record. 
Secondly, blacks could argue that to insist upon colonial land titles in the reconciliation, 
reconstruction and pursuit of equality era would contradict justice in the Radbruch formulation 
sense. Thirdly, it could be interpreted as the farming community’s rejection of reconciliation, 
reconstruction and the pursuit of equity, and therefore a declaration of war.  
 
Additionally, Mabo No.2
122
 turned down a long list of cases, including UK Privy Council decisions 
that had held that native peoples of colonised lands were “so low in the scale of social organization” 
that it is idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to Western civilisation. The 
fiction by which the rights and interests of indigenous inhabitants in land were treated as non-
existent was justified by a policy which has no place in the contemporary law. Per Brennan J:  
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The policy appears explicitly in the judgment of the Privy Council in In re Southern Rhodesia in rejecting the 
argument that the native people ‘were the owners of the unalienated lands long before either the Company or 
the Crown became concerned with them and from time immemorial ... and that the unalienated lands belonged 
to them still.
123
 
 
The second question that the SADC Tribunal’s finding in Campbell raises is the matter of whether 
the SADC Tribunal actually had jurisdiction to intervene in policy matters that are ordinarily the 
preserve of the executive under the requirement of separation of powers doctrine in a democratic 
society? The cases of ex parte Dyer, CCSU v. Minister for the Civil Service, and Commercial 
Farmers Union (CFU) and Others v. The Minister of Lands and Rural resettlement and Others 
(Zimbabwe) (2010) discussed above lead only to the conclusion that probably not. Courts have 
habitually held that substantive issues of national policy, of which Zimbabwe’s land reform policy 
is one, are not open to challenge before the courts other than on the basis of bad faith, improper 
motive or manifest absurdity. For this reason, it could be argued that the SADC Tribunal may have 
gone on a limb. 
 
Thirdly, even if we assumed that the SADC Tribunal had jurisdiction to intervene in the substantive 
matter of Zimbabwe’s constitutional land reform programme, it would still not escape the challenge 
of needing to arrive at a logically sustainable determination of the matters raised. However, the 
Tribunal’s finding can be challenged for its inconsistency with the commonly adopted Radbruch 
intolerability formulation which requires the judge(s) to reconcile the requirements of formerly 
valid laws of a perished order with justice in order to ensure law’s integrity. This, the suspended 
SADC Tribunal would have achieved by recognising and acknowledging the intolerability of 
colonial constitutional land laws and their incompatibility with justice, particularly in light of the 
salient racial divide in the allocation of land in Zimbabwe then.  
 
Instead, the Tribunal manifestly chose to contradict fundamental principles of justice when it upheld 
the legal consequences of colonial constitutional land laws while dismissing Zimbabwe’s own 
constitutional land laws that deliberately target the correction of imbalances in land allocation on 
racial lines.
124
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Moreover, the Tribunal failed to justify its decision to uphold unjust laws of the colonial legal order. 
It casually noted that:  
The applicants are, in essence, challenging the compulsory acquisition of their agricultural lands ... under the 
land reform programme undertaken by the Respondent. We note that the acquisition of land in Zimbabwe has 
had a long history. However, for the purposes of the present case, we need to confine ourselves only to 
acquisitions carried out under section 16B of the Constitution of Zimbabwe Amendment Act 17 of 2005.
125
 
It then immersed itself in textual interpretation to expose the literary inconsistencies between Act 17 
of 2005 and the prohibition against discrimination contained in Article 6 of the SADC Treaty. 
However, that literal interpretation of texts misses what the case was about when one considers the 
object and purpose of Act 17 which is also consistent with the SADC’s emergent regional 
constitutional customary international law norm on reconciliation, reconstruction and pursuit of 
equity.  
 
Other courts have properly determined similar challenges as requiring the reconciliation of law to 
justice by eliminating potential intolerability that could arise from giving legal effect to the issues 
premised on injustices of a preceding order. The German Federal Constitutional Court had 
disavowed Decree 11 of the Reich regarding nullification of citizenship of Jews in order to ensure 
the reconciliation of a Jewish lawyer with his inheritance which he would otherwise have been 
denied. So too had the Supreme Court of Australia in rejecting a long list of cases that had denied 
native rights to land based on the discredited doctrine of terra nullius.  
 
This begs serious questions about the suspended SADC Tribunal’s recognition of its own function 
as a human rights court of transitional States that are seeking to normalise a very abnormal set of 
circumstances, i.e. correcting land thefts that have lasted for over a century. The outcome in 
Campbell begs serious questions about the quality of the Tribunal’s property rights jurisprudence 
especially in light of State practice that increasingly is emphasising black economic empowerment 
as a norm of regional customary international law.  It shows why suspension of the Tribunal was 
never far from coming.   
 
More importantly, it raises the question of when, if at all, native indigenous Zimbabweans could 
hope to have their property rights claims recognised by law. Blacks have persistently sought after 
this recognition from the very time colonial confiscation of their lands began. African Kings had 
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fought and resisted Cecil Rhodes’ Pioneer Column to the death. Numerous monuments erected by 
the invading colonialists to commemorate several such battles exist to this day. 
 
Magaisa
126
 writes that Rhodesian courts showed no interest at all in enabling Africans to claw back 
any of their rights that colonial legislation had withdrawn, particularly with regards to land 
ownership. The case of Madzimbamuto v. Lardner-Burke
127
 is regarded as a seminal test of the 
independence of Southern Rhodesia’s judiciary. Nonetheless, only two judges had resigned in 
protest against the machinations of the Rhodesian government led by Ian Smith to defy a Privy 
Council judgment that had challenged the legality of the Smith regime. 
The provisions of the Lancaster House Agreement (1979) which had settled the 16 year civil war 
for majority rule had constrained the Zimbabwean government: 
1) To acquiring land for resettlement only on a willing seller/willing buyer regime. Therefore 
the government’s land reform programme would depend on the speed and extent to which 
commercial farmers were willing to make land available. As it turned out that strategy 
failed. It has also failed in South Africa. 
2) From making constitutional changes that would affect property rights of individuals within 
the first ten years of majority rule. 
Therefore, the Lancaster House Agreement required blacks to postpone any hopes of reconciliation 
with their land – a very frustrating thing indeed as it is land claims that had been the rallying point 
of the many sacrifices, including life, which many had had to make during the armed struggle for 
political freedom.  
 
With the satisfaction of the sunset clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement the Zimbabwe 
government had begun to amend its constitution so that they could overcome the frustrations of the 
commercial farming community which had held back land required to expedite the resettlement of 
landless peasants. It is these constitutional amendments that the white farmers sought declarations 
against at the SADC Tribunal. This was a indirect attempt to ensure the same result with or with no 
sunset clauses of the Lancaster House Agreement. The Tribunal, in its own words, did not care 
about the history that had eventually peaked in the suit before it. But the Campbell case shows also 
the peaking of blacks’ frustration with the denial of their legitimate expectations. 
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There is a real sense of misfortune when those whose actions should demonstrate objectivity and 
reason miss their opportunity. The suspended SADC Tribunal’s emergent jurisprudence on land 
reform sounded like the last nail in the coffin of native Zimbabweans’ hope for legal recognition of 
the injustices that have accompanied them in the name of the law since the arrival of the Pioneer 
Column on their territory in 1890 until now. What should they do that they have not already done 
for their land rights to be recognised at law and for them finally to be reconciled with their 
confiscated lands? The emergent land rights jurisprudence of the now suspended SADC Tribunal 
shows that even getting rid of settler apartheid regimes is not enough for this to happen. Neither is 
satisfaction of sunset clauses contained in settlement agreements such as the Lancaster House 
Agreement, nor the enactment of reconstruction legislation by majority rule governments. Hope 
alone that one day commercial farmers would make land available has proven to be illusory since 
colonisation.  
 
When judicial bodies such as the currently suspended SADC Tribunal extinguish hope held this 
long, and anarchy breaks out, it is because the law has lost its integrity. The SADC Tribunal’s 
emergent jurisprudence on land rights frustrate Asmal’s128 hope that law is that which people should 
instinctively turn to these days for collective self-expression.   
11. The SADC Tribunal: Handmaiden of Reconciliation and Reconstruction OR Defender of 
Apartheid’s Legacy?  
Commercial farmers’ apparent deployment of delay and frustration tactics against affected 
governments’ land redistribution programmes following the formal end of apartheid appears to have 
galvanised these States’ determination to reconcile natives to lands long lost under both colonial 
and apartheid rule. They are undeterred even by others’ characterisation of their land redistribution 
policies and programmes as racist, discriminatory and contrary to the rule of law. Nonetheless, 
racial discrimination is proscribed by numerous UN Conventions, the constitutive SADC Treaty 
itself, and also by constitutional provisions of these States even. But what makes those criticisms 
hollow is their insistence upon textual analyses of discrimination. Even UN Human Rights 
Committees that are tasked with interpreting the major universal human rights instruments – favour 
teleological interpretations that give due weight to context, or to genuine requirements, in order to 
ensure social justice. It is not a requirement of the principle of the rule of law to trump social 
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justice. Professor Miller has helpfully defined social justice as a people-oriented idea and a critical 
idea that “requires us to reform our institutions and practices in the name of greater fairness”.129  
 
On the contrary, the rule of law should always be a handmaiden of social justice because whenever 
social justice is threatened, peace and security, which are the pre-requisites for court activity, could 
not be guaranteed. The League of Nations had realised this fact and established the International 
Labour Organization by Chapter XIII of the Peace Treaty of Versailles for the specific purpose of 
ensuring social justice so that conditions of privation and hardship could never again be visited 
upon such a large number of the people of the world and lead to peacelessness and insecurity.
130
  
 
Moreover, SADC States individually possess all the competences that all other sovereign 
independence States possess, namely, to determine upon all constitutional law matters on their 
territories to the exclusion of other States’131 involvement, and in accordance with the requirements 
of the emergent universal human rights morality championed by the human rights movement.
132
 
Even the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights133 – the regional human rights instrument 
– qualifies its guarantee to the recognition and protection of property rights by subjecting it to the 
requirements of public policy. Article 14 provides that “[t]he right to property shall be guaranteed. 
It may only be encroached upon in the interest of public need or in the general interest of the 
community and in accordance with the provisions of appropriate laws.” 
 
Professor Murray writes that the African Commission on Human Rights has spent little time 
examining Article 14 of the ACHPR. However, in the few cases in which it has done so, they have 
related to land. The Commission’s view is that: 
 
 the right to property is a traditional fundamental right in democratic and liberal societies. …The role of the 
state is to respect and to protect this right against any form of encroachment, and to regulate the exercise of this 
right in order for it to be accessible to everyone, taking public interest into due consideration.
134
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Only by securing the channels for social justice can peace and security be secured. By their General 
Comments of 2009 and 1989, both the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights and 
the UN Committee on Human Rights have summarised and codified respectively their 
jurisprudence on the prohibition against discrimination. 
 
The UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights stated in its General Comment No. 20 
adopted at its 42nd session held in Geneva the position that although States are required under 
Article 2(2) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to ensure 
against formal and substantive discrimination in economic, social and cultural rights:  
 
[I]n order to eliminate substantive discrimination, States parties may be, and in some cases are, under an 
obligation to adopt special measures to attenuate or suppress conditions that perpetuate discrimination. Such 
measures are legitimate to the extent that they represent reasonable, objective and proportional means to 
redress de facto discrimination and are discontinued when substantive equality has been sustainably achieved. 
Such positive measures may exceptionally, however, need to be of a permanent nature, such as interpretation 
services for linguistic minorities and reasonable accommodation of persons with sensory impairments in 
accessing health-care facilities.
135
 
 
Therefore, the claim that constitutional land laws of affected SADC States are racist is very much 
open to question. The UN Human Rights Committee has cemented its view that the prohibition 
against discrimination is to be understood teleologically, and not textually. It stated in its General 
Comment No. 18:
136
 
 
[T]he principle of equality sometimes requires States parties to take affirmative action in order to diminish or 
eliminate conditions which cause or help to perpetuate discrimination prohibited by the Covenant. For 
example, in a State where the general conditions of a certain part of the population prevent or impair their 
enjoyment of human rights, the State should take specific action to correct those conditions. Such action may 
involve granting for a time to the part of the population concerned certain preferential treatment in specific 
matters as compared with the rest of the population. However, as long as such action is needed to correct 
discrimination in fact, it is a case of legitimate differentiation under the Covenant.
137
 
 
Colonial governments had passed and enforced successive pieces of draconian constitutional land 
laws that had left natives landless, stranded and compelled to become wage earners in order to pay 
hut and other taxes towards their new white rulers while the settlers themselves creamed off for 
themselves lands situated in zones with the most potential for agricultural activity and packaged 
them into large-scale commercial farms, national trust lands, etc.  
 
With the acquiescence of other SADC Member States Parties, these three longest apartheid ruled 
States appear to have successfully inaugurated in a very short period of time a regional norm of 
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customary international law on black economic empowerment as their basic norm for dealing with 
the salient legacy of apartheid rule engineered social and economic inequalities along racial lines.
138
  
 
The task of substituting economic and social equality for economic and social inequality in the post-
apartheid dispensation is made more complex by status-quo advocates’ pleas to respect for property 
rights and the respect for the rule of law and constitutional guarantees. It is also made difficult by 
the unflinching positions adopted by social justice advocates who insist upon the inviolability of 
apartheid rule engineered property rights in the post-apartheid dispensation.   
 
The task of substituting equality for inequality in transitional SADC States is made even more 
complex by the tensions around social and economic reconstruction between post-apartheid 
governments and judicial courts and tribunals that are manned by men and women that appear to be 
so removed from the realities from which the matters placed before them for adjudication originate. 
Their selective application of historical facts to the disputes would impress even the masters of 
fiction. Consequently, governments’ reaction to the findings of these tribunals has annihilated any 
hope that the SADC Tribunal in particular could give judicial judgments that governments would be 
keen to follow through.  
 
12. Conclusion 
The cases filed at the SADC Tribunal challenging Zimbabwe’s on-going land reform programme 
gave the SADC Tribunal the opportunity to objectively determine the question whether what had 
been legal under apartheid rule could still be insisted upon in the reconciliation and reconstruction 
era even though it breached the intolerability test under the Radbruch formulation. The SADC 
Tribunal is not the first judicial decision making body to have been confronted with this question. 
However, the SADC Tribunal appears to have made a right mess of it, and through its jurisprudence 
on the matter dismally failed Albert Thomas’ social relevance test. More importantly the SADC 
Tribunal failed to distinguish between matters of policy that properly belong to the province of the 
executive under the doctrine of separation of powers, and justiciable disputes that properly belong 
to the attention of the judiciary.  
 
Even if we supposed that these disputes were within the Tribunal’s jurisdiction, it is questionable 
whether its resort to legal transplants from incongruous Courts was a reasonable thing to do. The 
Tribunal failed to recognise that as a Human rights court for peoples in transition from apartheid –  
the worst form of government known to man in recent times – and attempting to make a way 
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towards egalitarian rule, it should have considered if it wished only that jurisprudence coming from 
courts that had presided over similar issues during their own societies’ transitions to egalitarian rule.  
In this sense, jurisprudence developed by the German Federal Constitutional Court at several points 
in the recent history of Germany would have been more apposite to the task of the Court than that 
of the ECtHR. 
 
Moreover, the Tribunal completely ignored the seminal jurisprudence of the Human Rights 
Committee on the application of the prohibition against discrimination for communities in 
transition. In particular it missed the teaching of General Comment 18 which authorises reverse 
discrimination in appropriate cases, of which the dismantling of the legacy of apartheid in the 
SADC is one. Instead the Tribunal pursued a narrow and simplistic formulation of the prohibition 
against discrimination in its attempt to apply the obligations of Article 6 of the SADC Treaty 
against the on-going land reform programme in Zimbabwe.  
 
Probably, the SADC Tribunal would have done better if it had taken due regard of the complete 
history of the land issue in the SADC, starting even with pre-colonial land rights in Zimbabwe. That 
would have established the validity or not of colonial constitutional land laws, if for instance the 
land had been terra nullius and the commercial farming community had had no prior rights to 
observe before establishing the farms at issue in the disputes before the Tribunal. Instead the 
Tribunal focused only on apartheid constitutional land laws as the only legal titles that were at 
issue.  
 
The Tribunal would have enhanced its legitimacy, which it did not, had it also taken account of the 
organic nature of the SADC’s constitutional arrangements, particularly in light of the sub-region’s 
current transitional circumstances from apartheid to more egalitarian societies. That would probably 
have brought to its attention the relevance to these land disputes of the later regional constitutional 
customary international law norm on reconciliation and reconstruction for the purpose of undoing 
the economic, social and psychological legacy of apartheid – the BEE norm. 
  
Consequently, the Tribunal could be criticised for failing to ensure law’s integrity because its ruling 
in the leading case of Campbell led to the view that indigenous natives’ quest for legal recognition 
of their right to lands confiscated upon colonisation and kept away from them by various legal 
games, including Privy Council determinations, and Lancaster House Agreement) protections of 
colonial rights, must continue, even 30 years after the formal end of apartheid rule in Zimbabwe. In 
this sense the Tribunal failed to ensure law’s integrity which required it to disavow false laws and 
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false interpretations of human rights’ prohibitions against discrimination. The SADC Tribunal had 
Human Rights Committee precedents to learn from if it wished, but it chose not to. Jurisprudence of 
the German Federal Constitutional Court, the Supreme Courts of Australia and Canada and more 
recently the UK House Lords all support the disavowing of validly established laws if they 
contradict the Radbruch formulation of justice. 
 
 
Therefore, a re-established SADC Tribunal would do well to interpret the SADC Treaty in matters 
presented before it in a way that ensures its own social relevance by several ways. It should always 
seek to: 
1) Maintain the distinction between non-justiciable public policy matters which are the 
preserve of the executive on the one hand, and justiciable matters that could fall for its 
determination in accordance with the Tribunal’s rules of procedure. 
2) Avoid developing a jurisprudence that is inconsistent with the requirement to disavow 
validly enacted laws of a perished order.  
3) Follow the guidelines of the UN Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights’ 
General Comment No. 20 of 2009 and of the UN Human Rights Committee in its General 
Comment 18 of 1989 on understanding and application of the prohibition against 
discrimination; neither of which appears to contradict the emergent SADC regional 
customary international law norm on proportionate reconciliation, reconstruction and 
requirement of equality. 
4) Fulfil its function as a handmaiden of reconciliation and reconstruction in SADC States’ 
transition from apartheid to democratic governance by making itself socially relevant to the 
newly inaugurated regional norm of customary international law on reconciliation, 
economic and social reconstruction, and the requirement of equity. 
5) Understand the application of lex specialis in light of general law. 
 
Only by ensuring these requirements could a reconstituted SADC Tribunal achieve integrity in 
its jurisprudence and also gain the social relevance which it had lost, resulting in the suspension 
of its mandate and role in the sub-region especially at a time when such a judicial institution 
was most needed. This is because SADC States have deliberately inaugurated lex specialis on 
post-apartheid social reconstruction. The aim is to undo apartheid rule engineered social and 
economic inequality on racial lines in affected States. The regional customary international law 
norm on reconciliation, economic and social reconstruction appears to have been promoted by 
South Africa, Zimbabwe, Namibia and Mozambique. It has been actively supported and 
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acquiesced to by other SADC Member States Parties. Its purpose is to ensure black economic 
empowerment. Normatively, the goal is to substitute equality under majority rule government 
for inequality under apartheid rule government. However, the fundamental presumption inherent 
in this development is that domestic and sub-regional judicial institutions of SADC States also 
perceive themselves to be, and actually function as, handmaidens of reconciliation, 
reconstruction, and the pursuit of equality in the post-apartheid era. Without judicial recognition 
of this ever increasing BEE legislation and administrative regulations, the lex specialis will play 
no part in the effort to redress social and economic inequality in affected States. 
